

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 6 DAR ES SALAAM 1384

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, TZ, US
SUBJECT: PARM -- ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT --
PART I

REF: CERP 0001

I. US INTERESTS

TANZANIA IS A WEAK AND VERY POOR NATION OF LITTLE STRATEGIC OR ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT NYERERE AND THE IDEOLOGICAL INVOLVEMENT OF TANZANIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS WHICH HE HAS SPONSORED, IT DOES HAVE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. TANZANIA FOR SOME YEARS HAS BEEN A MILITANT LEADER OF THE "NON-ALIGNED" WORLD, AND A KEY ACTOR IN THE STRUGGLE FOR MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

A. PRINCIPAL INTEREST. THE UNITED STATES IS NOW ENGAGED IN AND ACTIVE EFFORT TO PROMOTE MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, BY AS PEACEFUL A ROUTE AS POSSIBLE, AND IN WAYS WHICH WILL AVOID FURTHER BIG POWER MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE SORT THAT TOOK PLACE IN ANGOLA. FIRST ENUNCIATED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AT LUSAKA IN APRIL 1976, THIS POLICY WAS FOLLOWED UP BY INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY THROUGH-OUT THE REST OF THE YEAR. IT HAS BEEN GIVEN FRESH
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IMPETUS BY PRESIDENT CARTER'S ADMINISTRATION.

AS A RESULT OF THIS, TANZANIA IS WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH US IN THOSE AREAS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEM IN WHICH OUR AIMS COINCIDE AT LEAST IN PART. OUR MOST IMPORTANT INTEREST IS TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THAT COOPERATION. OUR INSTRUMENTS ARE OUR DIALOGUE WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE, POLICY DOCUMENTATION ACTIVITIES BY

USIS, AND CONTINUATION OF A BILATERAL ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM.

B. OTHER INTERESTS. OTHER AMERICAN INTERESTS IN TANZANIA ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE WE HAVE IN MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WE HAVE A HUMANITARIAN INTEREST IN PROMOTING TANZANIA'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND IN ENCOURAGING REGIONAL COOPERATION; IN INFLUENCING TANZANIAN POSITIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE MANY INTERNATIONAL FORA OF WHICH IT IS AN ACTIVE MEMBER; IN FOSTERING AMERICAN COMMERCE AND PROTECTING THE RIGHTS AND PROPERTY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN TANZANIA. WE NEED TO RETAIN OUR POLITICAL AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTING CAPABILITY. WE WISH TO DISCOURAGE COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN TANZANIA, OR COMMUNIST MEDDLING IN EAST AFRICAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, WHICH COULD BE INIMICAL TO OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

IN PROMOTING OUR MODEST INTERESTS, MOST OF THE TOOLS AND RESOURCES AT OUR DISPOSAL ARE NOT SINGLE-PURPOSE, AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT AFFECTS MORE THAN ONE AMERICAN CONCERN. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF ABSOLUTE CHOICES, BUT RATHER FINDING THE MIX OF RESOURCES AND POLICIES WHICH BEST SERVE THE TOTALITY OF OUR INTERESTS, WITH SOME INEVITABLE TENSION BETWEEN IMMEDIATE TANGIBLE PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL LONG-RANGE GAINS.

II. OVERVIEW

TANZANIA'S FUNDAMENTAL POLICIES AND ATTITUDES ARE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. TANZANIA IS ONE OF THE MORE CONSISTENT COUNTRIES IN AFRICA, WITH A FIXED SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY ON THE BASIS OF WHICH IT FORMULATES ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND WHICH SHAPES ITS REACTIONS TO EVENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, NYERERE RECOGNIZES THE REALITIES OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POWER-- AND WEAKNESS. WHILE HE IS PREPARED TO PAY A PRICE TO ACHIEVE IDEOLOGICAL GOALS, HE MOVES TOWARDS THEM GRADUALLY, AND WILL DEAL ON A PRAGMATIC BASIS WITH IDEOLOGICAL OPPONENTS WHEN HE MUST.

A. NYERERE IN CHARGE. BARRING ACCIDENTS, NYERERE IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO CONTINUE TO DOMINATE TANZANIA'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, AND WILL PERSONALLY DIRECT TANZANIA'S ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. HOWEVER, VICE PRESIDENT ABDOU JUMBE WILL PLAY AN INCREASING ROLE, AS NYERERE'S HEIR APPARENT, AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE CULTIVATED WITH AN EYE TO THE FUTURE.

B. SOUTHERN AFRICA. NYERERE REMAINS HEAVILY PREOCCUPIED BY SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS. HIS PRINCIPLES ARE SET: INDEPENDENCE AND MAJORITY RULE FOR RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA; THE END OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA. HOWEVER, HE IS REASONABLY OPEN

ON TACTICS. HE WOULD LIKE THE UK, US, OR UN TO START NEW INITIATIVES, SO LONG AS HE AND OTHER FRONT LINE STATES CAN CONSIDER AND PASS ON THEM.

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C. RHODESIA. IF ASKED, I BELIEVE NYERERE WILL BE HELPFUL IN GETTING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ANY NEW RHODESIAN NEGOTIATIONS, THOUGH HE BELIEVES THAT SMITH REQUIRES FURTHER MILITARY SOFTENING UP BEFORE HE WILL TALK TURKEY. SO LONG AS SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT INTERVENE, AND RHODESIAN INCURSIONS DO NOT JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF MOZAMBIQUE OR OTHER FRONT LINE STATES, I THINK NYERERE WILL CONTINUE TO COUNSEL STRONGLY AGAINST DIRECT SOVIET/CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. HE DISTRUSTS ANY NON-AFRICAN INTERFERENCE IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS, EVEN FROM "FRIENDLY" SOURCES, AND IS ALSO DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT EFFECTS ON AFRICA OF ANY US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION IN THE AREA. TO OBVIATE THIS, NYERERE WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE MILITARY AND OTHER SUPPORT TO MOZAMBIQUE, OR OTHER FRONT LINE STATES WHICH MIGHT BE THREATENED BY SMITH. SHOULD SOUTH AFRICA INTERVENE (AND NYERERE HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT AFRICAN ABILITIES TO STAND UP AGAINST VORSTER'S TROOPS), OR SHOULD ANOTHER FRONT LINE STATE FEEL OBLIGED TO CALL IN OUTSIDE HELP, NYERERE WOULD STOUTLY SUPPORT SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

NYERERE'S LIMITED LEVERAGE IN THE RHODESIAN SITUATION COMES FROM THE ARMS, TRAINING, AND ADVICE GIVEN TO COMPETING NATIONALIST GROUPS, AND HIS INFLUENCE ON OTHER FRONT LINE STATES, OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS, AND THE OAU. THOUGH THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO GO AROUND THE FRONT LINE STATES WHEN THEY CHOOSE, THEIR ABILITY IS LIMITED BY THE FRONT LINE STATES' GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION AND THEIR
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PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE GUERRILLA FORCES.

NYERERE'S PAST EXPERIENCE WITH TRYING TO GET THODESIAN NATIONALIS TO WORK TOGETHER HAS NOT BEEN A HAPPY ONE. AT PRESENT HE SUPPORTS THE MUGABE-NKOMO PATRIOTIC FRONT, AS "THE BOYS WITH THE GUNS," BUT HE WOULD PROBABLY MAKE NO EFFORT TO EXCLUDE OTHER ELEMENTS FROM A ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE. NYERERE DOES NOT APPEAR VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT, OR EVEN VERY INTERESTED IN, RHODESIA'S INTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS. AS THE KALEIDOSCOPE OF RHODESIAN NATIONAL FACTIONS CONTINUES TO SHIFT, NYERERE'S SUPPORT WILL BE CONDITIONED MORE ON THEIR IDEOLOGICAL TENOR AND EFFECTIVE POWER THAN ON THEIR DOMESTIC SUPPORT MANIFESTED THROUGH FAIR ELECTIONS, ETC.

D. NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA. NYERERE REMAINS KEENLY INTERESTED IN NAMIBIA AND IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL REGIME, THOUGH HIS ABILITY TO AFFECT EVENTS BY OTHER THAN DIPLOMATIC SUASION IS MUCH MORE LIMITED THAN IN RHODESIA. IN NAMIBIA HE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE OTHERS -- AND NOTABLY THE US AND UN -- TO DO SOMETHING TO INDUCE SOUTH AFRICA TO TRANSFER AUTHORITY TO SWAPO. HE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE AS COMPLETE AS POSSIBLE A WORLD BOYCOTT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME, AS AN EXPRESSION OF MORAL INDIGNATION, BUT RECOGNIZES ITS LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS. HE RECOGNIZES THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS NOT A "COLONIAL" PROBLEM AND STILL HOPES PEACEFUL MEANS CAN BE FOUND TO END APARTHEID AND BRING MAJORITY RULE THERE, BUT HAS NOT EVOLVED ANY SPECIFIC PLAN FOR THIS.

E. EAST AFRICA. TANZANIA WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE ON THE EAST AFRICAN REGIONAL SCENE, BUT THE PROBABLE SCENARIOS ARE HARDER TO PREDICT THAN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE IDI AMIN REGIME WILL REMAIN UNPREDICATBLE UNTIL ITS EVENTUAL DEMISE. KENYA FACES THE UNCERTAINTIES OF A PROBABLE SUCCESSION CRISIS. I AM INCLINED TO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT UGANDA HAS THE GREATER POTENTIAL FOR DISTURBING THE EAST AFRICAN BALANCE, DESPITE THE CURRENT BORDER FEUD BETWEEN TANZANIA AND KENYA. LEAVING ASIDE THE POSSIBILITY OF UGANDAN MILITARY ADVENTURES, THE FALL OF THE AMIN

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REGIME WOULD CREATE A VACUUM WHICH TANZANIA WOULD WANT A ROLE IN FILLING. THE TEMPTATION TO TRY TO ENSURE AN IDEOLOGICALLY COMPATIBLE REGIME WOULD BE ENORMOUS. TANZANIA WOULD ALSO BE TEMPTED TO TAKE IDEOLOGICAL SIDES SHOULD AN INTERNAL STRUGGLE DEVELOP IN KENYA, BUT ITS ABILITY TO ACT EFFECTIVELY WOULD BE LESS IN THAT FAR STRONGER NATION.

THE LEVEL OF SPARRING BETWEEN KENYA AND TANZANIA WILL PROBABLY

CONTINUE TO RISE AND FALL, BUT SOME ECONOMIC RELATIONS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE. THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY MAY SURVIVE BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY TO BE FULLY RESOTRED UNLESS THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT IDEOLOGICAL CHANGES IN SOME OF ITS ERSTWHILE PARTNERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE GROWING ECONOMIC COOPERATION -- AND PERHAPS SOME FORM OF COMMUNITY -- DEVELOPED BETWEEN TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE, ZAMBIA AND AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE.

F. THIRD WORLD ISSUES. TANZANIA WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO MANY ISSUES WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO US INTERESTS, SUCH AS INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO, AND NORTH KOREAN REUNIFICATION EFFORTS. THE "NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER" HAS BECOME FUNDAMENTAL IN TANZANIA'S THINKING. THERE IS LITTLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A LEADING OR PASSIVE TANZANIAN ROLE ON THIRD WORLD ISSUES BECAUSE TANZANIA CONSIDERS ITSELF BOUND BY THIRD WORLD SOLIDARITY.

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G. DOMESTIC POLICIES. THE OUTLOOK ON THE DOMESTIC SCENE IS FOR GRADUAL CHANGE IN ESTABLISHED DIRECTIONS. TANZANIAN SOCIETY WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE TOWARDS FULL SOCIALISM, AND THE ECONOMY WILL CONTINUE TO SUFFER FROM BASIC DEFICIENCIES AND DISAPPOINTING GROWTH IN PRODUCTION. THE HIGH DEGREE OF STATE CONTROL EXACERBATES THE SHORTAGE OF SKILLED MANPOWER, THE TYPICAL LDC PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY AND THE SYSTEM'S INABILITY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE CONSUMER GOODS. THESE FACTORS ARE CONTRIBUTING TO A DECLINING PRODUCTIVITY AND LACK OF SUFFICIENT MATERIAL INCENTIVES TO FARMERS AND WORKERS. FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS TANZANIA'S GROWTH RATES ARE EXPECTED TO BE MODEST. THE TREND TOWARDS INCREASED RELIANCE ON IDEOLOGY IN DECISION MAKING ALSO SEEMS LIKELY TO CONTINUE, WITH OCCASIONAL PRAGMATICAL BACK-

PEDALING FROM THE MOST OBVIOUS FAILURES. HUMAN RIGHTS WILL CONTINUE TO ERODE, IN THE NAME OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFORMITY, AND THE NEED TO PUNISH "ECONOMIC SABOTEURS". HOWEVER, RESTRICTIVE AND OPPRESSIVE MEASURES ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO BE MODERATE IN AFRICAN TERMS. AT SOME POINT NYERERE MAY RETIRE FROM THE PRESIDENCY, WHILE RETAINING EFFECTIVE CONTROL AS REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (CCM) CHAIRMAN, BUT HE WILL PROBABLY WAIT UNTIL AT LEAST THE END OF HIS CURRENT TERM IN 1980.

THE RELATIONS OF MAINLAND TANZANIA AND ZANZIBAR WILL REMAIN COMPLEX, DESPITE THE FORMAL UNION OF THE TWO PARTIES. ZANZIBAR
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TENACIOUSLY GUARDS ITS AUTONOMY. AT THE SAME TIME ZANZIBARIS ARE EXERTING A GREATER ROLE IN MAINLAND AND NATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND THE LONG-TERM VIABILITY OF THE UNION IS NOT YET COMPLETELY CERTAIN. OUR RELATIONS WITH ZANZIBAR WILL REMAIN TO SOME EXTENT DISTINCT FROM THOSE WE HAVE WITH THE MAINLAND.

OUR DAY-TO-DAY LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS HERE MAY DETERIORATE OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, BUT I AM REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THE USG WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO DO BUSINESS WITH TANZANIA, POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO NYERERE AND OTHER TOP LEADERS. OUR AID PROGRAMS WILL CONTINUE TO BE WELCOMED.

III. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION, AND ISSUES

FOLLOWING ARE OUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES IN TANZANIA OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, AS I SEE THEM, AND THE COURSES OF ACTION I PROPOSE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THEM.

A. OBJECTIVE: TANZANIAN COOPERATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN TANZANIA OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS WILL BE TO MAINTAIN A RELATIONSHIP WITH NYERERE WHICH WILL PERMIT COOPERATION ON AT LEAST SOME ASPECTS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEM. THE CHANGE IN AMERICAN AFRICAN POLICY, SINCE EARLY IN 1976, HAS OPENED UP CERTAIN AREAS IN WHICH WE HAVE AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER. ASSUMING THAT AREAS OF CONGRUENCE OF INTEREST CONTINUE, WE CAN PURSUE THIS OBJECTIVE BY:

1. COURSE: HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH NYERERE.

NYERERE, LIKE MOST AFRICAN LEADERS, RELIES GREATLY ON PERSONAL CONTACT IN HIS DIPLOMACIES. FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS AND SUMMITS TAKE PLACE CONSTANTLY, AND EVEN CORRESPONDENCE IS DELIVERED BY HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS. IF WE WISH TO WORK WITH NYERERE, HE MUST HAVE A CONFIDENCE IN THE MOTIVATION AND HONESTY OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP WHICH -- GIVEN OUR IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES -- CAN
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ONLY COME FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND CONTACT. JUST SUCH CONTACT HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN THE PAST YEAR BY THREE VISITS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND TWO BY US AMBASSADORS TO THE UN, WITH AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S FEBRUARY 1977 VISIT BEING ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE IN INCREASING TANZANIAN CONFIDENCE IN THE BONA FIDES OF THE US. NYERERE'S PRACTICE OF MEETING REGULARLY WITH ME (ON AN AVERAGE OF PERHAPS THREE TIMES A MONTH) HAS PROVIDED A USEFUL, CONSTANT, FRAMEWORK FOR HIS DIALOGUE WITH THE US.

FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS YEAR, FIRST CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO INVITING NYERERE TO THE UNITED STATES (SEE DAR ES SALAAM 717) AT AN EARLY DATE, SO AS TO ESTABLISH A FACE-TO-FACE RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. VISITS HERE BY THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, OR ANOTHER BY AMBASSADOR YOUNG WOULD BE VERY MUCH IN ORDER. TRIPS BY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS SUCH AS SENATOR CLARK, SENATOR PERCY, AND CONGRESSMAN DIGGS WERE VERY EFFECTIVE LAST YEAR AND SHOULD BE ENVISAGED AGAIN IN 1977. CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SENIOR USG OFFICIALS SHOULD BE CONTINUED AS THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN SITUATION EVOLVES. BECAUSE OF THE LIKELY INCREASING ROLE OF JUMBE IN THIS AND OTHER POLITICAL AREAS, OUR CONSULATE ON ZANZIBAR SHOULD BE RETAINED AS A LINK TO HIM.

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2. COURSE:CONTINUE DEVELOPMENTAL AID. US BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE DOES NOT INFLUENCE TANZANIAN VOTES OR

ATTITUDES ON QUESTIONS OF CONCERN TO US, AS TANZANIA FREQUENTLY DEMONSTRATES. HOWEVER, THE EXISTENCE OF AID PROGRAM IS A NECESSARY TICKET OF ADMISSION FOR AN EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN OTHER AREAS. IT SYMBOLIZES OUR GOOD WILL, AND EASES ENTREE IN THE SEARCH FOR COOPERATION IN OTHER AREAS. THUS, CONTINUATION OF A BILATERAL AID PROGRAM IS A KEY COURSE OF ACTION IN PURSUING OUR POLITICAL, AS WELL AS OUR HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS. INCREASING THE SIZE OF THE PROGRAM WOULD NOT BRING POLITICAL ADVANTAGES, BUT AND ABRUPT OR PUNITIVE TERMINATION WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE OUR WHOLE RELATIONSHIP.

B. OBJECTIVE: PROMOTE AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS.

A VARIETY OF FACTORS IN THE OVERALL TANZANIAN PICTURE HAVE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US. THESE INCLUDE THE TRANQUILLITY OF THE PRECARIOUSLY BALANCED EAST AFRICAN REGION, MILITARY/NAVAL INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND THE NEED FOR POLITICAL AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNIST AND OTHER ACTIVITIES. SOME, LIKE THE LAST, ARE SERVED BY OUR CONTINUED PRESENCE HERE, AND DO NOT REQUIRE ANY SPECIAL COURSES OF ACTION.

THE EAST AFRICAN REGIONAL SITUATION IS IMPORTANT TO US, NOT ONLY BECUASE OF OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND OUR DESIRE TO PROMOTE
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REGIONAL FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, BUT ALSO BECAUSE WAR WITHIN THE REGION, OR A BREAKDOWN OF ONE OR MORE OF ITS GOVERNMENTS, WOULD POSE SERIOUS DANGERS OF COMMUNIST EXPANSION IN THE AREA.

1. COURSE: DON'T ROCK THE BOAT. THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN DO IN A POSITIVE SENSE TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN EAST AFRICA, WHICH DEPENDS MOSTLY ON THE INTERACTION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA AND THEIR LEADERS. BUT WE SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED BY THE PARTIES AS HASTENING THE DEMISE OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY. WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR REGIONAL AID PROGRAM TO THE COMMUNITY, INCLUDING OUR RDOEA REPRESENTATION AT ARUSHA, FOR SO LONG AS IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION. WE SHOULD REMAIN EVENHANDED IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS TO KENYA AND TANZANIA, AND NOT APPEAR TO TAKE SIDES. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE TWO SHOULD BE IDENTICAL -- WE HAVE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN KENYA WHICH DO NOT EXIST IN TANZANIA.

2. COURSE: KEEP DOWN COMMUNIST MILITARY PRESENCE.

WE HAVE NO INFLUENCE ON TANZANIA'S INVITATIONS TO THE SOVIET AND CHINESE MILITARY TO TRAIN TANZANIAN SOLDIERS AND INSTALL MILITARY EQUIPMENT HERE. HOWEVER, TANZANIA EXCLUDES NAVAL VISITS FROM STATES WHICH DO NOT BORDER THE INDIAN OCEAN. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN THIS SITUATION, AND WE SHOULD NOT --

BY SEEKING ACCESS FOR AMERICAN NAVAL VESSELS -- ENDANGER IT.
DAR ES SALAAM WOULD BE OF DOUBTFUL VALUE FOR US NAVAL SHIPS,
BECAUSE SUPPLIES ARE SCARCE AND IT IS AN APPALLING LIBERTY PORT;
THE SOVIETS, LESS CONCERNED ABOUT SUCH MATTERS, WOULD PROBABLY
DERIVE GREATER VALUE FROM ACCESS THAN WE MIGHT.

3. COURSE: MAINTAIN OUR ZANZIBAR CONSULATE. WE
SHOULD KEEP OPEN OUR MINIMAL, TWO-AMERICAN CONSULATE ON
ZANZIBAR. THE ISLANDS' STRATEGIC LOCATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN,
AND THE ACTIVE COMMUNIST PRESENCE THERE, COUPLED WITH THEIR
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CONTINUED AUTONOMY, GIVE THEM A REPORTING INTEREST WHICH CANNOT
BE MAINTAINED EFFECTIVELY FROM THE EMBASSY IN DAR ES SALAAM.
ACCESS TO VICE PRESIDENT JUMBE IS ALSO GREATLY ENHANCED BY THE
CONSULATE'S EXISTENCE, AND HE -- THE NATION'S MOST LIKELY NEXT
PRESIDENT -- SETS CONSIDERABLE VALUE ON USG WILLINGNESS TO
MAINTAIN IT.

C. OBJECTIVE: SUPPORT TANZANIAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT. TANZANIA IS ONE OF THE WORLD'S POOREST NATIONS.
ITS ECONOMIC GROWTH IS IMPORTANT TO US REGARDLESS OF THE SYSTEM
AND IDEOLOGY IT HAS CHOSEN BOTH, FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND
IN THE LIGHT OF THE GROWING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE WEALTHY AND
POOR NATIONS. MOREOVER, TANZANIAN SOCIALISM IS LOOKED UPON AS
A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR OTHER LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

OUR ABILITY TO ACT IN THIS AREA IS SUBJECT TO CONSTRAINTS BEYOND
THE LIMITS OF OUR ABILITY TO GIVE, AND TANZANIA TO ABSORB,
AMERICAN AID. TANZANIA HAS CHOSEN A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
SYSTEM WHICH OFTEN DELIBERATELY SUBORDINATES GROWTH TO OTHER
VALUES. TANZANIA IS ALSO ONE OF THE FAVORITE CLIENTS OF A GREAT
MANY INTERNATIONAL DONORS; OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE APPLICATION
OF AID IS LIMITED BY THE EASE WITH WHICH TANZANIA TAPS ALTERNATIVE
SOURCES.

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1. COURSE: CONTINUE AMERICAN ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM.
OUR MAIN TOOL IN ASSISTING TANZANIAN DEVELOPMENT IN OUR AID
PROGRAM. WE CONCENTRATE ON THE AGRICULTURAL AREA WHERE WE
ARE BETTER QUALIFIED TO HELP THAN MOST OTHER DONORS AND TRY TO
REACH THE PEASANTS WHO ARE THE OVERWHELMINGLY MAJORITY OF THE
POPULATION. AGRICULTURE IS THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT'S TOP
PRIORITY. WE SHOULD CONTINUE THIS PROGRAM, WHICH IS WELL
RECEIVED AND PROPERLY UTILIZED, AND THE AREA OF EMPHASIS SHOULD
ALSO BE CONTINUED. LIKEWISE, WE SHOULD CONTINUE MODEST ASSISTANCE
TO SEMI-AUTONOMOUS ZANZIBAR.

MERELY INCREASING THE LEVEL OF OUR AID PROGRAM IS NOT LIKELY TO
BRING THE US SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DIVIDENDS. WE ARE FREE,
THEREFORE, TO STRUCTURE OUR PROGRAM ON BROADER CRITERIA. OUR
PRESENT GENERAL LEVEL IS \$7-8 MILLION ANNUALLY IN TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE PROJECTS, PLUS PL-480 FOOD, AND A FEW VOLUNTARY AGENCY
HEALTH AND WELFARE PROGRAMS. HOW MUCH WE MAY WANT TO INCREASE
IT DEPENDS ON THE ANSWERS TO A VARIETY OF QUESTIONS: HOW MUCH OF
OUR AVAILABLE RESOURCES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR TANZANIA IN
COMPETITION WITH NEEDS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD? HOW EFFECTIVE IS
A GIVEN PROJECT LIKELY TO BE IN FURTHERING DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS?
HOW WELL CAN TANZANIA ABSORB IT? WHAT OTHER DONOR MIGHT UNDER-
TAKE IT AS WELL OR BETTER? HOW MUCH DO WE WANT TO SUPPORT
TANZANIA'S PARTICULAR FORM OF SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT? OUR
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ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE FY 79 AID
ANNUAL BUDGET SUBMISSION NOW BEING PREPARED. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS
SAFE TO ESTIMATE AT THE MOMENT THAT THAT BUDGET WILL NOT FLUCTUATE
MORE THAN 20 PERCENT FROM THE PRESENT LEVEL.

WHETHER OR NOT THE AID PROGRAM IS INCREASED IN AMOUNT, THERE
IS, I THINK, NEED FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY. IT IS ONE THING TO
START PROJECTS OR NEW INSTITUTIONS, IT IS QUITE ANOTHER -- IN
TANZANIA -- TO OPERATE THEM EFFECTIVELY. ADMINISTRATIVE AND
MANAGERIAL SKILLS REMAIN IN VERY SHORT SUPPLY; SUPPORT SERVICES
WHICH QUITE RIGHTLY SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ARE OFTEN HOPELESSLY INADEQUATE. TO ENHANCE THE SUCCESS OF OUR
PROJECTS, WE NEED GREATER AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE MANAGERIAL
SERVICES AFTER INSTITUTIONS HAVE THEORETICALLY BEEN TAKEN OVER

BY THE TANZANIANS, AND TO OURSELVES PROVIDE SERVICES (E.G., VEHICLE MAINTENANCE, STORAGE FACILITIES, STAFF HOUSING) WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE CONSIDERED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TANZANIA.

2. COURSE: EDUCATE TANZANIANS IN AMERICAN WAYS.

ALTHOUGH THE VIRTUES OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGERIAL SKILLS ARE APPRECIATED BY SOME TANZANIAN OFFICIALS WHO HAVE TRAVELED ABROAD, TANZANIANS AT HOME LIVE IN AN IDEOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE OF UNRELENTING HOSTILITY TOWARDS EVERYTHING AMERICAN. WE SHOULD, IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE, SEEK TO MODIFY THE "OFFICIAL" TANZANIAN IMAGE OF AMERICAN, AMERICANS, AND THE OPERATIONS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY AND ECONOMICS. THIS IS A CAMPAIGN OF MANY FRONTS, TO WHICH ALL COMPONENTS OF THE MISSION CONTRIBUTE, AND IT SHOULD BE CONTINUED AND EXPANDED TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY.

USIS ACTIVITIES ARE AT THE CENTER; NOTABLY THE EXCHANGE VISITOR PROGRAM AND THE INFORMATION WE ARE ABLE TO DIFFUSE LOCALLY THROUGH VISITING LECTURERS, FILM AND VIDEO-TAPE PROGRAMS, DIRECT MAIL, AND THE LIBRARY AND BOOK PROGRAMS. USAID IS INVOLVED; NOT ONLY DO TANZANIAN PARTICIPANT TRAINEES RECEIVE AN EDUCATION IN AMERICA ALONG WITH THEIR TRAINING, BUT TANZANIANS AT HOME CAN LEARN FROM EXPOSURE TO THEIR AMERICAN TECHNICAL COUNTERPARTS.

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THE EMBASSY AND OUR CONSULATE ON ZANZIBAR PLAY A PART THROUGH CONTACTS WITH TANZANIANS. NOR SHOULD WE OMIT THE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL VALUE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS THE EXECUTIVE SERVICE CORPS, AND EXCHANGES SPONSORED BY US NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE THE EFFECTS OF THESE EFFORTS TO COUNTERACT TANZANIAN IDEOLOGICAL DISTORTION. WE CAN HOPE THAT IT WILL LEAD SOME TANZANIAN BUREAUCRATS TO FOLLOW MORE PRAGMATIC AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES IN THEIR DEVELOPMENTAL EFFORTS, THUS AIDING TANZANIAN DEVELOPMENT. IN THE LONG RUN WE CAN ALSO HOPE THAT WE ARE CONTRIBUTING TO A TANZANIAN WORLD VIEW MORE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN THAN THAT WHICH PREVAILS HERE TODAY.

D. OBJECTIVE: PROMOTE AMERICAN INTERESTS. THOUGH OUR COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN TANZANIA ARE MODEST, THEY DO MAKE SOME CONTRIBUTION TO OUR ECONOMY. AMERICANS IN TANZANIA ALSO LOOK TO THE EMBASSY FOR PROTECTION OF THEMSELVES AND THEIR PROPERTY FROM IMPROPER TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT ACTION. TANZANIA HAS BEEN DILATORY IN PROVIDING COMPENSATION FOR NATIONALIZED AMERICAN PROPERTY. AMERICANS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS ARE SOMETIMES HARRASSED BY THE POLICE AND OTHER AUTHORITIES, AND ARRESTED OR DETAINED WITHOUT PROPER CAUSE. TANZANIA CONSISTENTLY FAILS TO LIVE UP TO ITS CONSULAR TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO INFORM THE EMBASSY OF DETENTIONS OF AMERICANS.

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ACTION AF-08

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 6 OF 6 DAR ES SALAAM 1384

1. COURSE: PROMOTE US TRADE. AS TANZANIA BECOMES INCREASINGLY SOCIALIST, THE BULK OF ITS FOREIGN TRADE IS HANDLED BY GOVERNMENT AND PARASTATAL ORGANIZATIONS. AMERICANS WISHING TO DO BUSINESS MUST BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE OFTEN EXASPERATING PROBLEMS OF DEALING WITH THESE BUREAUCRACIES. WE SHOULD INCREASE OUR EFFORTS TO ENABLE THEM TO DO SO. THE DEPARTURE OF A LOCAL COMMERCIAL ASSISTANT WHOSE TIES WERE LARGELY WITH PRIVATE BUSINESS, PROVIDED US THE OPPORTUNITY TO FIND A REPLACEMENT BETTER SUITED TO DEAL IN THE EXPANDING AREA OF GOVERNMENT TRADE.

2. COURSE: PRESS FOR COMPENSATION. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR SETTLEMENT OF ALL OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, BUT THE CASES -- THOUGH FEW IN NUMBER AND SMALL IN AMOUNT -- REMAIN UNSOLVED.

3. COURSE: PRESS FOR BETTER TREATMENT OF AMERICANS. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPRESS ON TANGOV OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS, THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCORDING AMERICANS THE NORMAL RIGHTS AND COURTESIES ENJOYED BY VISITORS IN MOST FOREIGN COUNTRIES. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

E. OBJECTIVE: MODERATE TANZANIA'S POSITIONS ON INTER-NATIONAL ISSUES. TANZANIA PLAYS AN ACTIVE AND INFLUENTIAL ROLE IN MARSHALLING THIRD WORLD OPINION ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, OFTEN
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IN OPPOSITION TO US INTERESTS. TANZANIA VIEWS THIS ROLE AS A
CALEAR AND IMPORTANT MANIFESTATION OF ITS POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE,
NON-ALIGNMENT, AND ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIRD WORLD SOLIDARITY.
WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT TO HAVE MUCH SUCCESS IN MODERATING TANZANIAN
POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES BUT BELIEVE THE OBJECTIVE
SHOULD BE PURSUDED.

1. COURSE: DIALOGUE WITH POLICY MAKERS. TANZANIA IS SELDOM
INFLUENCED BY US APPROACHES ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. UNDER-
STANDING IS ONLY GAINED WHEN IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE
US POSITION CONTAINS SOMETHING OF BENEFIT FOR TANZANIA.

2. COURSE: KEEP TANZANIANS INFORMED OF US POSITIONS. USIS
INFORMATION PROGRAMS AND THE DISTRIBUTION F US FOREIGN POLICY
MATERIALS TO SELECTED INDIVIDUALS HELP GAIN AN UNDERSTANDING OF
THE RATIONALE BEHIND US STANDS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. IMPROVED
UNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER, IS OFTEN INADEQUATE TO AFFECT TANZANIAN
PERCEPTIONS AND JUDGMENTS.
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